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Abstract. This short paper outlines an analogy-based decision method.
It takes advantage of analogical proportions between situations, i.e., a
is to b as c is to d, for proposing plausibly good decisions that may
be appropriate for a new situation at hand. It goes beyond case-based
decision where the idea of graded similarity may hide some small but
crucial differences between situations. The method relies on triples of
known cases rather than on individual cases for making a prediction on
the appropriateness of a potential decision, or for proposing a way of
adapting a decision according to situations. The approach may be of
interest in a variety of problems ranging from flexible querying systems
to cooperative artificial agents.
1 Introduction
Making decision on a daily basis often relies on past experience [1], rather than 
being an explicit utility-maximization business based on the knowledge of a util-
ity function. This observation has led decision theorists to propose an axiomatic 
modeling of case-based decision, relying on a repository of cases already experi-
enced, where expected utility is replaced by a weighted average of the utilities of 
the results of this decision in various situations that are similar to the current 
situation, the sum being weighted in terms of this similarity [7].
A qualitative counterpart to case-based decision has been proposed [2,3]. 
Thus an optimistic (resp. pessimistic) decision criterion implements the idea 
that a decision is all the better as it led to a good decision in at least one (resp. 
all) situation(s) similar to the current situation, where the decision was made. 
Since both goodness and similarity are matters of degree, these two decision 
criteria estimate respectively to what extent the intersection of two fuzzy sets is 
not empty and to what extent a fuzzy set is included in another one.
While the idea of case-based decision is intuitively attractive, it may be 
difficult to implement it due to the difficulty of eliciting meaningful similarity 
relations between situations. Indeed, two situations may be quite similar in many 
respects and still have one crucial difference, in such a way that for a considered 
decision, we may obtain a good result in one case and a bad one in the other. 
Such a remark calls for an analysis in terms of analogical proportions. Analogical
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proportions are statements of the form a is to b as c is to d, which compare a
pair (a, b) with a pair (c, d) in terms of the similarities and of the differences
between the elements of each pair [11].
In the following, we outline an approach to analogy-based decision where we
take advantage of a repository of past experiences in terms of analogical propor-
tions, suggesting the benefits that may be expected from such a view. We first
provide a short background on case-based decision, and then on analogical pro-
portions, before presenting the approach. The structural resemblances between
case-based decision and flexible querying have been already discussed [4]; this
leads to conjecture some applications of analogy-based decision to flexible query-
ing. We also advocate the interest of analogy-based decision for artificial agents
that have to cooperate with humans on the basis of past interactions.
2 Case-Based Decision
In case-based decision, we are supposed to have at our disposal a repository R
of experienced decisions under the form of cases ci = (si, δi, ri), i ∈ [1, n]. Case
ci means that decision δi ∈ D (D is the set of potential decisions), applied in
situation si ∈ S (S is the set of considered situations), has led to result ri ∈ R; it
is assumed that ri is uniquely determined by si and δi. Consider a new situation
s0, which may not be in S, for which we have to take a decision δ0. Let S be a
similarity measure defined on S×S that associates each pair (si, sj) of situations
with a positive real number S(si, sj) ∈ [0, 1].
Classical expected utility is then changed [7], for a candidate decision δ into
U(δ) 
Σ(si,δ,ri)∈R s.t. δi=δ S(s0, si) · u(ri)
Σ(si,δi,ri)∈R s.t. δi=δ S(s0, si)
,
where u is a utility function, here supposed to be valued in [0, 1]. Note that the
value of u needs to be known only for the cases in the repository. Decision is
made by choosing δ ∈ D such that it maximizes U(δ).
A pessimistic and an optimistic qualitative counterparts [2] are given by
U∗(δ)  min(si,δi,ri)∈R s.t. δi=δ S(s0, si)→ u(ri) and
U∗(δ)  max(si,δi,ri)∈R s.t. δi=δ min(S(s0, si), u(ri)).
U∗(δ) expresses that decision δ is all the better as the fuzzy set of results asso-
ciated with situations similar to s0 where decision δ was experienced is included
in the fuzzy set of good results. When x → y = max(1 − x, y), U∗(δ) = 1 only
if the result obtained with decision δ in any known situation somewhat similar
to s0 was fully satisfactory. U
∗(δ) expresses that a decision δ is all the better as
it was already successfully experienced in a situation similar to s0. See [3] for
postulate-based justifications. The very pessimistic and optimistic nature of cri-
teria U∗ and U
∗ may be softened by introducing fuzzy quantifiers; for example,
one might already be satisfied if a decision was a good choice in most similar
cases, thus allowing for a few exceptions [4]. Note that these criteria may lead
to prefer a rarely experienced decision that always led to good results (if any),
rather to choose a decision with more feedbacks, but some bad ones. However, it
may be desirable to avoid an accumulation effect if the same decision is chosen
routinely for the same, frequently occurring, situation and thus is stored several
times in the repertory of cases. In fact, what is addressed here is the possible
variability of the output of a decision made in more or less similar situations
rather than its possible non deterministic nature when repeatedly applied in
(apparently) the same situation.
A situation s is usually described by means of several features, i.e., s =
(s1, ..., sm). Then the evaluation of the similarity between two situations s and
s′ = (s′1, ..., s′m) amounts to estimating the similarity for each feature k accord-
ing to a similarity relation Sk, and to combine these partial similarities using
some aggregation operator agg, namely S(s, s′) = aggk=1,...,mS
k(sk, s′k). A clas-
sical choice for agg is the conjunction operator min, which retains the smallest
similarity value as the global evaluation. But one may also think, for instance,
of using some weighted aggregation if all the features have not the same impor-
tance. See [4,5] for more details, references to generalizations to incompletely
specified cases, or with discounting of untypical cases, and applications to flexi-
ble querying including examples (and counter-examples)-based querying1.
3 Analogy: Brief Review
Analogical proportions provide another way to compare situations. Analogical
proportions are statements of the form a is to b as c is to d. Let us assume that
the four items a, b, c, d are represented by sets of binary features belonging to a
universe U (i.e., an item is then viewed as the subset of the binary features in U
that it satisfies). Then, the dissimilarity between a and b can be appreciated in
terms of a ∩ b and/or a ∩ b, where a denotes the complement of a in U . Indeed
a∩ b (resp. a∩ b) is the subset of properties possessed by a (resp. b) and not by b
(resp. a). The similarity is estimated by means of a∩ b (the subset of properties
possessed by both a and b) and/or of a∩ b (the subset of properties that both a
and b do not possess). Then, an analogical proportion between subsets is formally
defined [9] as a conjunction of equalities:
a ∩ b = c ∩ d and a ∩ b = c ∩ d
This expresses that “a differs from b as c differs from d” and that “b differs from
a as d differs from c”. It can be viewed as the expression of a co-variation.
It has an easy counterpart in Boolean logic, here denoted a : b :: c : d, where
a, b, c, d now denote simple Boolean variables. In this logical setting, “are equated
to” translates into “are equivalent to” (≡), a is now the negation of a, and ∩ is
changed into a conjunction (∧), and we get the logical condition expressing that
4 Boolean variables make an analogical proportion:
a : b :: c : d  (a ∧ b ≡ c ∧ d) ∧ (a ∧ b ≡ c ∧ d)
1 An item is all the more a solution as it resembles to some example(s) in all important
aspects, and is dissimilar from all counter-examples in some important aspect(s).
It is logically equivalent to the following condition that expresses that the
pairs made by the extremes and the means, namely (a, d) and (b, c), are (posi-
tively and negatively) similar [9]. This could be used as a definition as well:
a : b :: c : d  (a ∧ d ≡ b ∧ c) ∧ (a ∧ d ≡ b ∧ c).
An analogical proportion is then a Boolean formula. a : b :: c : d takes the
truth value “1” only for the 6 following patterns for abcd: 1111, 0000, 1100, 0011,
1010, 0101. For the 10 other lines of its truth table, it is false (i.e., equal to 0).
A worth noticing property, beyond reflexivity (a : b :: a : b), symmetry (a :
b :: c : d ⇒ c : d :: a : b), and central permutation (a : b :: c : d ⇒ a : c :: b : d)
is the fact that the analogical proportion remains true for the negation of the
Boolean variables [11]. It expresses that the result does not depend on a positive
or a negative encoding of the features describing the situations:
a : b :: c : d⇒ a : b :: c : d (code independency).
Moreover, analogical proportions satisfy a unique solution property, which means
that, 3 Boolean values a, b, c being given, when we have to find a fourth one x
such that a : b :: c : x holds true, we have either no solution (as in the cases of
011x or 100x), or a unique one (as, e.g., in the case of 110x). More formally, the
analogical equation a : b :: c : x is solvable iff ((a ≡ b) ∨ (a ≡ c)) = 1. In that
case, the unique solution x is a ≡ (b ≡ c) [9]. The following example provides
an illustration with nominal values, where the Boolean patterns are replaced by
patterns of the forms XXYY, XYXY, and XXXX. Note that the 4th line (i.e.,
the description of Queen) can be calculated from the 3 first lines by solving here
three analogical equations in terms of nominal values. This validates that “a
man is to a king as a woman is to a queen”.
Sex Position Human
Man M ordinary yes
King M power yes
Woman F ordinary yes
Queen F power yes
The basic idea underlying the analogical proportion-based inference is as
follows: if there is a proportion that holds between p components of four vectors,
then this proportion may hold for the last remaining components as well. This
inference principle [12] can be formally stated as below:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., p}, ai : bi :: ci : di holds
∀j ∈ {p+ 1, ..., n}, aj : bj :: cj : dj holds
This is a generalized form of analogical reasoning, where we transfer knowl-
edge from some components of our vectors to their remaining components, tac-
itly assuming that the values of the p first components determine the values of
the others. Then analogical reasoning amounts to finding completely informed
triples suitable for inferring the missing value(s) of an incompletely informed
item. In case of the existence of several possible triples leading to possibly dis-
tinct plausible conclusions, a voting procedure may be used, as in case-based
reasoning where the inference is based on a collection of single cases (i.e., the
nearest neighbors) rather than on a collection of triples. We may now move from
case-based decision to analogical-proportion based decision.
4 Analogy-Based Decision
Let us consider a generic scenario where a decision δ was experienced in two
different situations sit1 and sit2 in the presence or not of special circumstances,
leading to good or bad results respectively depending on the absence or on the
presence of these special circumstances. Suppose we have in our repository the
first three lines of the following table (cases a, b, c), while we wonder if we
should consider applying decision δ or not in sit2 when no special circumstances
are present (case d). The analogical inference leads here to the prediction that
the result should be good.
Case Situation Special circumstances Decision Result
a sit1 yes δ bad
b sit1 no δ good
c sit2 yes δ bad
d sit2 no δ good
Further comments are in order here.
– First, note that if we apply a case-based decision view, case d might be found
quite similar to case c, since they are identical on all the features used for
describing situation sit2, and differs only on the maybe unique feature describ-
ing the so-called “special circumstances”; this would lead to favor the idea
that decision δ in case d would also lead to a bad result as in case c.
– However, a more careful examination of cases a, b, c may lead to an opposite
conclusion. Indeed it is natural to implicitly assume here that the possibly
many features gathered here under the labels “situation” and “special circum-
stances” are enough for describing the cases and for determining the quality
of the result of decisions applied to the cases. Thus, the fact that in sit1, the
quality of the result of decision δ is bad (resp. good) is explained by the pres-
ence (resp. absence) of “special circumstances”. Then the analogical inference
enforces here that we should have the same behavior in sit2.
– But, note that nothing forbids to also have in the repository a pair of cases
pertaining to another situation, say sit3, which is a counter-example to this
behavior, namely one may have the two cases a′ = (sit3, yes, δ, good) and
c′ = (sit3, no, δ, good) that states in sit3 the “special circumstances” feature
has no influence when δ is applied; then from cases a′, c, c′, observing that
(sit3, yes, δ) : (sit2, yes, δ) :: (sit3, no, δ) : (sit2, no, δ), one concludes by ana-
logical inference that the result of decision δ in case d is then bad. This would
mean here that it is the situation itself that determines if the result is good
or bad.
– Thus different triples may lead to different predictions for the case d under
consideration. Thus, one may associate each potential decision δ with the
multiset E(δ) of the evaluations expected for its result in the current case.
For instance, E(δ) = {good, good, bad}, or more generally in case of a non
binary evaluation, e.g., E(δ) = {very good, good, good, bad, very bad}. The
difficulty is then to compare multisets of different sizes, e.g.,{good} and
{good, good, bad}. Indeed what is better? To choose a rarely experienced deci-
sion that is always associated with a good prediction? Or to choose a decision
with many good predictions, but some bad ones? Then, several ways of han-
dling these multiple evaluations are possible:
• a simple majority vote for summarizing the evaluation of each candidate
decision δi;
• a more sophisticated weighted sum; for instance, in the above example,
sit2 may be much closer to sit1 than to sit3 (in terms of Hamming dis-
tance), which leads to somewhat discount the evaluation bad and consider
that we are closer to good.
Generally speaking, this approach can be split in two steps:
step 1: For each candidate decision δ, one first looks for triples (a, b, c) of
available cases pertaining to δ whose utilities u(a), u(b), u(c) are known, such that
the utility equation u(a) : u(b) ::u(c) : x is solvable (an analogical proportion
that holds involves one or two distinct utilities). This task which reduces the
space of candidate triples can be performed oﬄine.
step 2: When one wonders what to do in a case d = (d1, . . . , dp), one looks
for candidate triples a = (a1, . . . , ap), b = (b1, . . . , bp) and c = (c1, . . . , cp) such
that analogical proportions hold component-wise for the feature values, i.e., the
proportion holds on all features (if they are all regarded as relevant), or at least on
a maximum number of features (analogical inference tolerates irrelevant features,
but then requiring that the proportion holds on all features would diminish the
number of triples available). Then, the solution of the utility equation u(a) :
u(b) ::u(c) : x for any such triple (a, b, c) is a possible value of the utility u(d) of
the result of the application of δ in case d.
This approach extends from the Boolean features case to nominal and numer-
ical features, since the definition of analogical proportion can be extended to
these cases [5,6].
5 Adaptive Decision with Analogy
Rather than analogically predicting the evaluation of the output of a potential
decision in a new situation, one may suppose that we start with a repertory of
recommended actions in a variety of circumstances, and then one may also think
of trying to take advantage of the creative capabilities of analogy for adapting
a decision to the new situation. Indeed, from three patterns, say, e.g., 00, 01,
10, by solving equations 0 : 0 :: 1 : x and 0 : 1 :: 0 : y, one may obtain a fourth
pattern, here 11, which is new.
This may be useful when the final decision has diverse options. Such as
Serve a tea with or without sugar, with or without milk. Let us consider this
example to illustrate the idea. As stored in the table below, in situation sit1
with contraindication (c i), it is recommended to serve tea only, in situation sit1
with no c i, tea with sugar, while in situation sit2 with c i one serves tea with
milk. What to do in situation sit2 with no c i ? Common sense suggests tea with
sugar and milk, maybe. It is what analogical proportion equations says: indeed
δ : δ :: δ : x, 0 : 1 :: 0 : y and 0 : 0 :: 1 : z yield xyz = δ11 as in the table below.
Case Situation Contraindication Decision Option 1 Option 2
a sit1 yes δ 0 0
b sit1 no δ 1 0
c sit2 yes δ 0 1
d sit2 no δ 1 1
We have only outlined how to adapt a decision, viewed as a compound act,
depending on circumstances, by means of an analogical proportion-based rea-
soning. Further investigations are needed for developing the idea.
6 Some Potential Uses
The approach has been presented in general decision terms, and may be applied
to different problems. We suggest here two examples of potential uses we may
think of.
In querying systems it is important to try to avoid empty sets of answers.
Replacing good (resp. bad) by non empty set (resp. empty set) in the kind of
generic example of the Sect. 4, one may predict when a query may lead to an
empty set of answers based on the results of past queries that are not too far
from the query under consideration (i.e. differing on few points on which the
risk of empty set of answers is sensitive). Then one may also identify the special
circumstances that favor empty sets of answers.
Robots must learn utilities from sparse feedback. If the context of the situa-
tions is to be considered when learning preferences then the parameter set may
be far larger than the training set resulting in over-fitting. The ability to make
generalizations between alternative preferences allows the robot to learn more
from less data. Just as linear regression does not need the power set of alterna-
tives to learn corresponding weights, the ability for a robot to learn relationships
in the data leads to an acceleration of the learning process with fewer mistakes.
It also enables small but crucial situational differences in circumstance to be
more quickly identified which may otherwise be hard to untangle.
7 Concluding Remarks
This short paper only intends to suggest the potentialities of analogical
proportion-based decision. In that respect it is preliminary and much remains
to be done for its effective use in practice. Moreover, the proposed approach
belongs to a general trend of research that amounts to reasoning with data [10].
Another benefit of this approach relies in its explanation capabilities, i.e., that
the robot will be able to explain what it is doing and why. Besides, interestingly
enough, the use of quaternary relation where the variation (or the dissimilarity)
from a to b is greater (or smaller) than the variation from c to d, rather than
being equal to as in analogical proportion, has been also recently introduced in
deep learning [8]. This might lead to fruitful developments.
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